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Introduction
Significant changes in the auditing environment world-wide have, in recent
years, led to important changes in the behaviour of market participants. The
main environmental changes have been the world-wide recession, dating from
approximately 1989, which led to overcapacity on the supply side of the market.
These changing competitive pressures resulted in aggressive fee renegotiation
and competitive tendering of audit services by companies (see, for example,
Beattie and Fearnley (1994) for the UK; and Lawson (1993) for Australia).
Moizer (1994) specifically identifies tendering as a means by which
independence is threatened: “the use of the tender process will enable the
management to claim that the auditor was replaced because a cheaper one was
found and not for any reasons of dispute between the company and the audit
firm” (p. 20). There have been reports of, and evidence concerning, significant
audit fee discounting (see, for example, Accountancy (1992) and Accountancy
Age (26 May 1994) for the UK; Hancock (1993a) for South Africa; IAB (1993a)
for Italy; and IAB (1993b) for Denmark; Johnson (1994) for Australia; and Maher
et al. (1992) for the USA), lowballing (see, for example, Hancock (1993b) for
Italy; LaFrentere and Carr (1991a) for Australia; LaFrentere and Carr (1991b) for
Canada; and Pong and Whittington (1994) and Financial Times (18 May 1995)
for the UK), and suggestions of cross-subsidization of audit costs from non-
audit services (NAS) provided by audit firms (Peel and Brinn, 1993). In
combination, these behavioral responses have produced an increase in the
incidence of tendering and in the overall rate of auditor change. For example,
Beattie and Fearnley (1994) estimate that the incidence of tendering by UK
listed companies which had/had not changed auditor during the period 1987 to
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1991 to be 55 per cent and 6 per cent respectively, with 82 per cent of all tenders
resulting in a change of auditor.
The importance of these economically-driven behavioural changes stems
from their potential impact on auditor independence and audit quality, which
regulatory bodies have sought to address (for example, AARF (1992) in
Australia; AICPA (1992) in the US; FRC (1991), Cadbury Committee (1992),
CAJEC (1992; 1993; and 1995), APB (1994), and ICAEW (1994 and 1995) in the
UK; and MIA (1993) in Malaysia). Given the growing importance and frequency
of tenders in the audit environment world-wide and the related concerns being
expressed, the overall aims of this paper are to explore the nature of the tender
process to understand more fully the reasons for auditor change and the basis
of selection of the new auditor. Auditor choice theory suggests that, given the
nature of the demand for external audit, auditor choice will be jointly influenced
by auditee characteristics (particularly those related to agency costs), auditor
characteristics (such as size, reputation, class and industry specialization) and
the auditing environment (Wallace, 1980)[1]. Client-auditor realignments have
been found to be generally attributable to temporal changes in client
characteristics (Johnson and Lys, 1990)[2]. (For a comprehensive review of the
theory and evidence linking auditor choice, audit fees and auditor
concentration see Yardley et al. (1992).)
To our knowledge, the tender process has not previously been studied. The
need for the consideration of matters such as audit tendering has recently been
expressed by the Cadbury Committee (1992, p. 33). We introduce to the
accounting literature existing knowledge of the theory of tendering from other
disciplines and the practice of tendering from other areas of business activity
and relate these findings to a series of interviews held with the finance directors
of UK listed companies which had recently changed auditors (the majority via
tendering). These interviews build upon existing knowledge, gained from
questionnaire surveys and the analysis of publicly available secondary data, by
providing a richer understanding of the actions, beliefs and perceptions which
can combine to precipitate change. 
The principal objective of this paper is to investigate empirically the auditor
change process, especially changes arising from tenders. A subsidiary objective
is to review relevant economic concepts and theory. These objectives are
covered in sections three and two, respectively. In section two, general analytical
tender models, developed in economics, are described. The assumptions and
implications of these models are compared and contrasted and their relevance to
the audit market is outlined. In section three, we present an analysis of the
auditor change process derived from interviews with 12 UK listed companies
which had recently conducted a tender and/or changed auditors. Quotations
from interviews are included to support this analysis of typical audit tender
characteristics. Discussion of these characteristics incorporates issues arising
from section two. The final section summarizes and considers the implications
of our findings.
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Literature review
Tender theory forms part of the microeconomic analysis of auctions and
bidding[3]. As a mechanism for effecting trades, auctions are an alternative to
both posted prices and individual bargaining, with posted prices being suitable
for standardized items. In practice, a combination of both bidding and
bargaining over specifications are often employed in trades. Three basic types
of auction are in use: “English” (open outcry, ascending bid), “Dutch” (open
outcry, descending bid) and highest-price sealed bid. 
A basic bidding model concerns the standard sealed-price auction where the
lowest bid wins and where the bidders have no observably different
characteristics (i.e., a symmetric auction). It is assumed that the bids made by
competitors are statistically independent and that their distribution can be
estimated from history (i.e., there is no unobserved common factor affecting all
of the competitors’ bids), and the bidder knows the amount that it will cost him
to complete the contract (i.e., each bidder can ignore the others’ information in
forming their cost estimates). These assumptions are known as the
independence and private values assumptions respectively. If bi is the bid of the
ith bidder and c is the cost of completing the contract, then it can be shown that
expected profit is P(bi ≤ b)(bi – c), i.e., the probability that a bid of bi beats all
other bids times the profits. In competitive bidding, bi should be selected to
maximize this expression (Milgrom, 1989, p. 4). In symmetric environments, all
types of auction described above are efficient and lead to the same expected
revenues for the seller and expected profit for the bidder (Milgrom, 1989, pp. 9-
10 and p. 16).
It is usual, however, for the actual costs of completing the contract to be a
random variable, C, i.e. for the private values assumption to be invalid. An
important result of bidding theory which emerges in this case is a phenomenon
known as the winner’s curse which describes the situation where the winner’s
bid is, on average, too low. To illustrate, assume for the sake of simplicity that C
is common to all bidders who each make independent estimates of C. Although
the estimation errors are independent, the estimates themselves are not.
Moreover, although each estimate remains unbiased, the lowest estimate is
biased downward. Provided all bidders determine their bids by adding a mark-
up which is positively related to cost, the winning bidder will be the one with
the lowest estimate of costs and the winner’s cost estimate will, on average, be
too low (Milgrom, 1989, pp. 4-5). The implications of this are twofold. First, to
make a profit it is necessary to mark up bids for both the underestimation of
costs on the contracts won and a profit margin. Second, the returns in
competitive bidding come from cost and information advantages. Studies of
offshore oil leases find evidence of the winner’s curse, although experimental
studies suggest that experience can teach bidders to avoid it (Thiel, 1988, p.
284). 
Another important theoretical result is that in asymmetric first-bid auctions
(i.e. Dutch and standard sealed bid auctions where the bidders have observably
different characteristics) the equilibrium allocation will not necessarily be
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efficient (i.e. Pareto optimal), in the sense that the bidder with the highest
personal valuation (lowest costs) will not make the highest (lowest) bid and
therefore will not win[4]. The theory makes no clear predictions about the
outcomes in such cases.
Due to the mathematical complexity of auction theory, it is only very recently
that attempts have been made to incorporate a quality dimension into the basic
models (Cripps and Ireland, 1994; Ungern-Sternberg, 1994). Ungern-Sternberg
(1994) has shown that there exists a commitment problem, in that the price-
quality schedule which the buyer specifies ex ante may not reflect ex post
preferences, since buyers’ ex ante relative quality weight acts as an incentive for
the bidders to invest in quality-improving up-front costs. Cripps and Ireland
(1994) compare three tender designs which have a quality threshold which is
not known with certainty by the bidders. In the first design, quality plans must
be submitted and approved before price bids will be accepted. At the price-bid
stage each bidder knows the number of bidders and their quality plans. This
design reflects the case where “quality tests are largely a matter of the
established reputation of the bidders” (p. 318). In the second design, price bids
are submitted first to generate a ranking for quality review, with the first plan
to satisfy the quality threshold being accepted. In the third design, price and a
quality plan are submitted jointly. Cripps and Ireland (1994) model the
symmetric, two-bidder case, measuring quality as the probability of passing the
unknown and uncertain quality threshold. They find, perhaps surprisingly, that
all three designs are equivalent in terms of expected profit and social welfare,
although their analysis does not consider whether the winning plans will
actually be required to be carried out. In the case of fixed-price contracts, the
purchaser must ensure that the contractor does not act opportunistically, either
by attempting to maximize profit by reducing standards without detection, or
by attempting to renegotiate the contract in his favour. Tight control over both
the specification and the enforcement of the contract are necessary (Walsh,
1991). 
Laffont and Tirole (1991) introduce the concept of the auction designer – the
individual who acts on behalf of the principal in organising the tender process.
This agency relationship raises concerns that the auction designer may prefer,
or collude with, a specific bidder, by either biasing their subjective evaluation of
quality or distorting the relative weights of the various attributes to favour a
specific bidder.
These theoretical analyses of auctions and bidding strategies provide a
rigorous basis for the discussion of tenders in the audit context. Six conclusions
emerge. First, since audits are not a standardized item, posted prices are not a
suitable mechanism for effecting trades. It is, rather, individual bargaining that
tenders have replaced in the audit market. Second, the use of tenders rather than
individual bargaining by companies is a rational response to increased
competition in the audit market, since bargaining is best avoided when there is
enough competition for auctions (Milgrom, 1989, p. 19). Third, audit tenders are
not symmetric, since audit firms have observably different characteristics. In
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particular, the big six/non-big six distinction reflects different perceptions of
reputation, some firms are industry specialists, and firms adopt different audit
approaches. Theory makes no clear predictions about the outcome of tenders in
such cases. In addition, with the exception of listed company start-ups, college,
local government and health service audits, there exists an incumbent auditor
who has information and cost advantages over other bidders. This allows the
incumbent to estimate his costs of contract completion more accurately than
other bidders. The latest audit fee is, however, known to all bidders, and this can
be viewed as a benchmark (similar to a posted price) which must, ceteris
paribus, be undercut to obtain the contract.
Fourth, where the costs of contract completion are not fixed, the model
results in an outcome where the winner is “cursed”, in that their bid is too low.
This may partially explain the lower audit fees observed post-tender. Rational
responses by audit firms to lower fees or losses arising on tendered audit work
would be to improve efficiency and/or to increase profit margins on other
services to the client. The potential for cross-subsidization in the audit context
is high, due to the existence of significant other fee sources (Peel and Brinn,
1993). Low bids may, however, also arise from competitive strategies (DeAngelo,
1981b), particularly strategies to establish a presence, or increase market share,
in a specific market sector. 
Fifth, as a consequence of the committment problem, it is difficult to identify
favoritism in the choice of winner. Related to this issue is the current concern in
auditing that the de facto control which executive management has in the
appointment (and remuneration) of auditors presents a corporate governance
failure. In the UK, the APB has recently proposed that “audit committees of
listed companies should have specific responsibility, as a proxy for
shareholders, for the appointment and remuneration of auditors” (APB, 1994). 
Finally, a key feature of audit tenders would appear to be that the winning
bid is selected on the basis of quality characteristics as well as cost, since
quality signalling is an important factor in the audit process. In the audit
market, the first tender design identified by Cripps and Ireland (1994) applies, in
that the audit firm’s reputation/size is used as an initial test of quality in the
selection of tenderers, with the “big six” firms being seen as possessing a
qualitatively higher reputation than other firms[5]. In the context of audit
tenders, it has been established that the board of directors, especially the
finance director, acts as the auction designer (Beattie and Fearnley, 1993).
Thus, in their current stage of development, economic auction models have
four limitations for audit settings. First, the analysis of the more complex cases
which incorporate a quality dimension are restricted to the symmetric case,
which does not apply to audits. Second, the unknown, multiperiod nature of
audits is an important added complexity. Standard contracts relate to a fixed
term, whereas audit contracts are, legally, renewed annually, despite the shift
towards audit fee agreements which extend beyond one year. In practice, it is
usual for auditor-company alignments to continue for many years[6]. The
unknown duration of the relationship is another complication which is difficult
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to model satisfactorily. Third, the costs of preparing a bid are largely ignored[7].
Finally, and most importantly, tenders commonly involve only two parties.
Thus, in standard commercial contracts, risk (i.e., responsibility for service
failure) is shared between the contractor and the purchaser. In the audit setting,
however, there are three key parties: the audit firm (service provider), the board
of directors (purchaser), and the shareholders (recipients of service). Company
boards have no direct responsibility for audit performance failure, and in some
circumstances may benefit from it where auditors have failed to detect
directors’ misdoings. Responsibility for the design and delivery of audit lies
entirely with the audit firm. The risks associated with failure also lie with the
audit firm (in the form of withdrawal of audit licences, professional disciplinary
proceedings and, where a loss has been suffered, large claims and damaging
publicity) and only affect the shareholders if the audit failure leads to financial
loss. The boards of listed companies are able to minimize the risks of audit
performance failure for their shareholders by recommending a large (big six)
audit firm, size being a proxy for quality (DeAngelo, 1981a). If, therefore, all
bidders can be taken to satisfy minimum quality levels and be financially
stable, then the selection of a “winner” should, rationally, be price-based;
provided a reputable audit firm is appointed this decision is risk-free for the
company directors[8]. It may also be noted that opportunistic behaviour by the
contractor is unlikely in the audit setting, given this risk distribution.
Interview evidence
The objective of the interviews was to obtain detailed insights into the
circumstances surrounding the auditor re-appointment and change process
(particularly focusing on tendering). Rich data on such issues cannot be elicited
using questionnaires, which has been the method of investigation into auditor
change most frequently used to date. Very little is known about how the audit
tender and change process actually works, and the semi-structured interview
approach allows us to focus on understanding the dynamics present within
single settings. Since prior studies have shown that finance directors are the
most influential party in both the audit appointment decision and the tendering
process (Beattie and Fearnley, 1993; Hussey and Jack, 1994, p. 22), we focused
on eliciting the finance directors’ frames of reference, i.e. the structure of their
choice decision and the forces and relationships which either create and sustain,
or change, this structure.
Methods
Twelve UK listed companies which had conducted a competitive tender,
changed auditors, or both between 1989 and 1992 were interviewed. Additional
selection criteria were applied to ensure that a range of company size, industry
sectors, audit firms, geographical locations and listing status were represented
in the sample (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 537).
Turnovers ranged from £6m to £4bn. Industry groups included engineering,
distribution, foodstuffs, brewing, leisure and hotels, software, media, property,
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and financial services. Twelve audit firms were directly involved as gainers and
losers, including five of the big six, three other top 20 firms, two top 50 firms
and two small firms. Other firms were involved as tenderers. Company
locations included London, the South Coast, the Midlands and Yorkshire. Nine
companies were fully listed. Nine of the companies selected had conducted a
competitive tender. All 12 finance directors agreed to be interviewed on the
assurance that neither they,  nor their auditors, would be publicly identified or
identifiable. The characteristics of respondents’ companies and their audit
firms are summarized in Table I. 
Interviews, which were one-to-one and (with one exception) conducted on the
company premises, were all carried out by the same researcher who is a
qualified accountant and experienced auditor. A relationship of trust was
established with the interviewee by the confidentiality assurance and the
common professional ground (all but one of the interviewees being a qualified
accountant). The interviews were semi-structured using a small number of
broad open-ended questions designed to bring to the surface directors’ strategic
thinking about the issues (other related issues were explored as they arose).
Main topics (e.g., why did the company decide to change auditors?) identified
from prior studies were formed into a question route, although flexibility was
permitted in introducing these topics to improve the flow of the interview.
Neutral, conversational prompts and a laddering technique, which involves
Tier of Tier of Geographical
Case Tender outgoing incoming location of Audit Listing
no. Turnover Industry conducted? auditora auditor company committee status
1 <£50m Eng.–
vehicles Yes (2) Third First; first Provincial Yes Full
2 <£50m Software Yes Third First Provincial No USM 
3 >£50m Engineering Yes First First London HO Yes Full 
4 >£50m Leisure & 
hotels Yes First First Provincial Yes Full 
5 >£50m Food Yes Second First London HO Yes Full 
6 <£50m Property Yes Second First London HO Yes Full 
7 >£50m Distributors Yes First First Provincial No Full 
8 <£50m Food Yes First Second Provincial No Full
9 <£50m Engineeering No First First Provincial No Full 
10 <£50m Media No Third Second London HO No USM
11 <£50m Brewing No First Second Provincial No Full 
12 <£50m Financial N/A:
services Yes First no change London HO Yes USM
Note: aFirst tier auditors are defined as the “big six”; second tier auditors are taken as the next
14 firms, based on the audit market concentration measures reported in Beattie and Fearnley
(1994, p. 310); third tier firms are all other firms
Table I.
Characteristics of 
respondent companies
and their audit firms
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asking “why” and “with what consequences”, were employed as necessary.
Each interview lasted between one and two hours and all were tape-recorded
and subsequently transcribed in full for further analysis (Jones, 1985). 
Interview transcripts were content analysed: a coding scheme was developed
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990, pp. 57-74) and themes (or categories) identified from
the data. A summary from each respondent’s interview was prepared to assist
within-case analysis. These summaries were then tabulated using the identified
themes, forming a matrix display and facilitating the search for cross-case
patterns (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Strauss and Corbin, 1990, ch.10).
The remainder of this section summarizes the results of this analysis of the
auditor tender/change process as described by the interviewees. The process
has been divided into five chronological stages: the reasons for change (which
provides the tender context), the choice of firms invited to tender or accept
appointment, the organization of the tender process, the choice of new audit
firm, and the after-effects of the change. Individual sub-sections cover each
stage. Quotations from the interviewees, edited to preserve confidentiality, are
included throughout to support the findings. A summary of the key issues
identified by interviewees at each stage of the auditor tender/change process is
provided in Table II.
Reasons for change 
A total of 23 distinct reasons for auditor change were cited by the interviewees,
of which nine were attributable to sudden or gradual changes within the client
company. In two cases new management had put a number of services out to
tender, including audit, to test the market and ensure value for money. There
was, therefore, no definite intention to remove the incumbents. In two cases the
decision to rationalize the group’s auditors prompted the change, while in
another case the company adopted a policy of putting professional services out
to tender. Expansion or change in corporate activities was a reason for change
in three cases, as companies sought the extra dimension of business advice and
guidance (case 2), special transactions capabilities (case 6), with an international
scope (case 10). One company succumbed to pressure from its non-executive
directors to appoint an auditor that was more of a known name in the City (case
1). The remaining 14 reasons for change, however, involved specific problems
with the current auditor. These problems related mainly to audit staff and
quality issues, rather than fees. Excessive audit staff turnover was cited in two
cases: 
we were getting new articled clerks… so they were having to be led by the hand through the
procedure every year (case 1) 
and
… except for the managing clerk… I don’t think we saw the same face in here three years
running… to change [the audit staff] every year is very traumatic… because people have got
to be taken round the factory, shown all the routine, shown the internal audit steps again – it’s
a problem… we’ve had instances where you’ve had the same question asked in a different
guise in three different ways (case 8). 
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Table II.
Key issues at each stage
of the auditor/tender/
change process
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One company’s board decided, without discussing the problem with the
incumbent, to change auditors because they felt that the partner who was
standing in during the engagement partners’ illness was too old: 
… most of the directors of this company were sort of early forties or younger and we got this
partner in his sixties and he had, sort of, no knowledge of the company, no interest in us, and
nothing really we could get on with, and we found when we were sitting around at meetings,
we’d all be quite young – solicitors all quite young and the merchant bankers were quite young
and you had these two old men from [third tier firm] and we thought “this is getting silly” (case
10). 
Another company were simply unimpressed by their allocated partner:
…he didn’t really understand the industry, he was always very late with providing us with
information – returns for regulators tended to have to be biked at the last moment’ (case 12). 
Six reasons relating to the professionalism and competency of the audit firm
were identified. One company objected to the fact that their auditor wasn’t
“…interested in doing internal controls… all of a sudden we went to a full
balance sheet audit” and was “…encouraging us to look at slightly more racy
accountancy policies” (case 1). In one case the existence of “substantial
undisclosed liabilities” in a company acquired “on the basis of the published
year-end accounts” and audited by another office of the same firm, combined
with “serious gaps in financial reporting controls” (case 9) led to the auditor’s
replacement, while in another case replacement resulted from the chairman’s
dissatisfaction with the quality of corporate finance advice received on the
disposal of a subsidiary: 
[the auditor] didn’t act quickly enough in the eyes of the chairman and didn’t give…sufficient
or accurate advice…they upset him – bang, off you go chum! (case 11).
In another case the problem was that the auditors 
showed off when they got our business [by] making it known that they’d got it before we’d
actually officially awarded it to them…my chairman…felt that this was very much a breach
of confidence (case 12). 
Subsequently, one of the company’s regulators intimated that the audit firm
didn’t appear to understand their client’s business. Fees were a contributing
factor in only two cases. In one case, suspected cross-subsidization was the
problem – incoming auditors had “cut their fee rate by 20 per cent to get the job
and they were expecting to be able to cover that from other types of fees
throughout” (case 1), while in another company a dispute arose when, without
prior discussion, the fee greatly exceeded that quoted, due to additional
accountancy work being undertaken (case 12). Finally, the split of a regional
audit partnership into individual local offices “wasn’t acceptable” (case 1) to one
company, while a distance of 100 miles from its auditor ultimately proved
unacceptable to another:
the senior partner there who dealt with our affairs…used to have round-up meetings that he
always scheduled on his way to [coastal town] because he had a flat in [coastal town] and you
know whilst that was understandable from him, it isn’t quite the sort of response that we
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want. I mean, if we want a meeting, we want to diarise when we want it and not quite, you
know, if he’s going down to [coastal town] (case 2). 
Twenty-six factors which could lead a company to consider changing its
auditor were identified by Beattie and Fearnley (1995), with level of audit fee,
dissatisfaction with audit quality (i.e. auditor’s ability to detect problems) and
changes in top management being the main reasons, cited by, respectively, 49
per cent, 41 per cent and 35 per cent of the actual auditor changers within the
sample. The interview evidence presented here, however, suggests that issues
relating to change within the company and the auditor’s professionalism and
competency are the most frequent change drivers, with fees being a less
frequent change driver. Fees appear to precipitate change only when they
breach acceptable tolerance limits and were seldom identified as the only
change driver. (We suggest that if fees are the sole reason for discontent it would
be cost-efficient for both parties to negotiate a reduction rather than engage in a
costly tender and change process.) 
Choice of firms invited to tender or accept appointment
In the three cases where no tender was conducted, the client-auditor
relationship had broken down (see Table II, column 2, cases 9, 10, and 11). The
chairman chose the replacement firm in two of these cases, instigating
enquiries through personal contacts to find an audit partner of good reputation
in a local office in one case. In the other case the chairman was more impressed
by the corporate finance performance of the firm acting for the other side in an
acquisition although their office was a considerable distance away, so they were
appointed. In the third of these cases, the board had decided against the big six
and an approach was made through a contact between a non-executive director
and a corporate finance partner in a top 20 firm.
Where tenders were conducted, it had to be decided which firms to invite to
tender. Three smaller companies expressed reluctance to invite the very largest
firms on the grounds of size match: 
we believed that we would be better off in the ten to twenty range…where…their size matched
our size (case 1), 
we felt…we were too small a fish in a great big pond to get the service that we wanted (case
8), 
and
there was a much better match between the size of our organization and their organization
(case 12). 
A related reason for selecting a second tier firm was expressed by one of the
non-tendering companies: 
although we were on the USM, which counts for Brownie points in the rankings, we thought
we were probably at the back of the queue for any good staff or any good advice in a big firm.
In eight cases, however, the board (especially non-executive directors)
specifically wanted a top (normally big six) audit firm in order to have “an
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auditor that was more of a known name in the City” (case 1) and with the
required scope and expertise. No differentiation between the big six firms was
generally made.
An important finding was that the majority of companies expected audit
firms to offer more than audit services. For example: 
We want, obviously, an efficient audit, but we also want the add-ons (case 6),
We were very keen to see what…total solution they could provide (case 2), 
If we’re making acquisitions or investment they [the audit firm] by nature get involved (case
5), 
We’d obviously use them [the audit firm] for anything to do with the City basically (case 8)’, 
The more important area of work we use the audit firm [for] is due diligence and corporate
finance work on acquisitions (case 4). 
This finding is reinforced by several of the reasons for change cited above: the
need for business advice, special transactions, and concerns over perceived
cross-subsidization. A number of other choice factors emerged, though with less
frequency. For two companies located outside London the location of the firm
was important, consequently only those with local offices were invited. Where
auditor changes resulted from rationalization, only the incumbent firms were
invited. In another company, two firms were expressly excluded because they
were either the subject of, or were acting as expert witness in, “ongoing
litigation” (case 4). Incumbent firms were in all cases invited to tender, although
in one case the firm refused whilst in another they weren’t seriously considered.
The interview evidence shows that, in general, the choice of firms invited to
tender initially arises from specific requirements by listed companies for either
a big six firm (to signal quality) or a second tier firm (to obtain size congruence).
This demonstrates that audit firms do have observably different characteristics
and hence that audit tenders are not symmetric. Although the reputation and
range of services provided by big six firms was universally recognized, and
provided a preliminary quality filter, several smaller companies preferred, for
behavioral rather than economic reasons, the size match with second tier
firms[9]. It is notable that none of the companies was, at this stage of the tender
process, seeking an audit firm which specialized in their industry. 
Within these class constraints, the selection of firms invited to tender is
based on factors such as location, personal knowledge of individuals or firms
and the wish/perceived need to exclude certain firms. These selection factors
(i.e., audit firm class, proximity of office, personal contacts, and specifically
excluded audit firms) resulted in considerable variation in the number of firms
invited to tender (ranging from two to six). Conflicts of interest, not directly
connected with the audit appointment, which led to firms being excluded from
tendering included ongoing or potential litigation and secondment to
regulators. Such conflicts are a direct outcome of the limited number of
accountancy firms operating in the listed company market, each offering a wide
range of services and highlights the problems associated with a rising level of
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audit firm concentration, and the resulting limitation of choice. In addition, the
interviewees did not distinguish between the legal appointment of auditors and
the engagement of the audit firm for NAS. 
Organization of the tender process
In all cases the finance director was heavily involved in at least the early stages
of the tender process. The general pattern in the nine tender situations involved
the receipt of written quotes by invited firms followed by oral presentations to
the full board, the audit committee (cases 1 and 3) or some other senior
management group by those shortlisted. This was preceded by a briefing
meeting with the finance director in one case and factory visits in another two.
Only three companies issued a detailed written specification of their
requirements. This may be because the audit per se is defined externally and the
audit process is outside the directors’ control. It may also be that audit firms are,
for the reasons discussed above, unlikely to act opportunistically, rendering
tight control unnecessary. 
In one case, the specification was based on lessons learned from an earlier
tender and comprised approximately one hundred pages of: 
the audit requirements we were looking for, the sort of documentation we would expect to give
them, the timescales of when we would expect them to come in, have the audit finished,
consolidated…when they could expect printers’ proofs…the type of audit that we were
looking for – the fact that we were not happy with just having a balance sheet audit, that we
wanted an audit that covered internal control, if only on a rolling basis…we stressed that fees
were not a problem to us…we wanted…to make sure it was the right quality of audit or the
right relationship…we wanted them to understand that there were no other fees there and if
any other jobs did come along that…we were quite likely to put them out to tender (case 1).
As discussed above, in general the tender process related implicitly not just to
the audit attest function, but to a larger package of services relating to the
annual financial reporting process, and to the availability of other, less regularly
recurring, services. Despite this, the quoted fee relates exclusively to the audit.
Thus a range of services was being bought and sold through the tender process,
of which the legal audit formed only a part. The audit firms were therefore
expected to present themselves on the basis of all the services they could offer.
This also enabled the directors to distinguish more easily between firms.
In at least one case, the specification invited bids on the basis of a fixed-term,
fixed-price contract, while in another the contract duration and fee was set at
the time of appointment. It may be noted that fixed-price contracts are common
in both of the industries represented by these companies: 
what I do welcome is that they don’t go on this time and materials rubbish…we do a lot of
fixed contract work…it’s not so much the fixed price, it’s the commitment…it’s sharpened us
up and I don’t see why solicitors, accountants and bankers should be any different (case 2).
It appears that companies are attempting to treat audit services as a standard
commercial contract, despite the fact that auditors (especially non-incumbents)
cannot know ex ante the amount of work necessary to form an opinion.
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Six of the nine companies which tendered had an audit committee, in each
case chaired by a non-executive director (see Table I). This appeared to affect
the influence of the finance director (auction designer), in terms of their
involvement with the five stages of the tendering process (initiation of idea,
invitation of bids, attendance at presentations, evaluation of bids, and final
decision). In the three cases where no audit committee existed, the finance
director was involved in all stages (with the minor exception of one case where
the idea originated elsewhere). Where an audit committee did exist, however,
the finance director was not involved in the crucial final decision stage in three
cases (50 per cent). In these three cases, either the audit committee or the audit
committee chairman (or both) were involved in the final decision. Thus the
influence of the finance director is reduced by the existence of the audit
committee.
A further issue highlighted by the tendering process is the period of
appointment. Normally, a contract awarded by tender would be both fixed-price
and fixed-term. An audit contract is legally renewed annually, yet in two cases
fees were agreed between directors and auditors for a fixed period (providing
further evidence of the ineffectiveness of the shareholder appointment
procedure). An indefinite period of appointment (where the auditor does not
know how long the appointment will last) sits uncomfortably with competitive
tendering. In two cases new auditors were quickly dismissed, almost on a whim,
for reasons which would not legally need to be drawn to the attention of the
shareholders. 
Choice of new audit firm
There were a variety of reasons for eliminating firms early on (i.e. often before
the oral presentations) in the nine tender situations. In two cases poor written
quotes were cited: 
it showed that they had not looked and understood the group (case 1)
while a female finance director was irritated by
a standard presentation chopped about a bit for us. I mean they’d even addressed the thing
“dear sirs”, when, you know, you’d think they’d have the courtesy to look to see who was on
the board. The others had taken a bit more time and care with it.
In one case, a big six firm 
did not believe that they ought to do an audit on internal controls…they failed to understand
that it wasn’t necessarily Cadbury or the Institute that was driving us (case 1).
One company developed a questionnaire that each operating company
completed following visits by the audit firms, which were judged “on the way
they asked their questions about what they were trying to find out, …their
knowledge of the business and their… charisma” (case 5). This appraisal
resulted in one firm’s rating falling significantly below the others. Another firm
(the incumbent) was eliminated because of inadequate overseas support. In the
case of a financial services company, subject to heavy regulation, all the big six
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firms invited to preliminary discussions were eliminated because of concerns
about their relationship with the regulators: 
they have a policy of seconding their personnel to the regulators… we do not like our business
being discussed behind our backs which is inevitable in this system (case 12). 
Fee issues emerged in three cases only. One company considered a quoted audit
fee to be too low, which led to doubts concerning the quality of the firm’s work,
and others to be too high relative to other quotes received. In another case the
incumbent auditor quoted 20 per cent below their current fee. When asked to
justify the reduction, he effectively eliminated his firm with the ill-judged
remark: 
“I didn’t realise I’d got to be competitive” …that was the final nail in the coffin, that comment,
particularly when I repeated it to my board members (case 8).
The financial services company was concerned about possible future cross-
subsidization attempts and fee disputes with big six firms arising from the
existence of specialist teams formed within these firms: 
we have a number of specialist points which we wish to raise… and we would be very quickly
involved in a fairly hefty fee from the specialist department… the contracts which are now
drawn up by the large audit practices are so tightly drawn that anything which falls outside it
would fall outside the terms of the contract and one would be in acrimonious position from
day one when talking about fees (case 12).
Only in one case was a shortlisted firm positively eliminated. This occurred
because 
unfortunately one of the partners that had been involved in doing the tendering investigation
had quit… [the presentation] came badly unstuck on the day. They didn’t really know what
they were talking about; they kept getting the subsidiaries mixed up (case 1).
In general, however, bases on which to discriminate between the shortlisted
firms had to be found. In several cases, respondents expressly commented that
potential bases (access to partner, ability, service, personalities, fees) were not
used: “complete access [to audit partners], which we think important, was
stressed by all firms” (case 2); “I would have expected them all to fulfil the
function of auditor very well” (case 4) and “there wasn’t really any difference in
what the two firms could provide for us” (case 7); “it wasn’t the personalities”
(case 6). In total, six of the nine tendering companies did not base their decision
on fees, either because the quotes were very close or because fee level was
within the acceptable range. For example: 
so it went down to those two and [big six firm] got it – not on price, although they were the
cheapest as well (case 1), 
fees were remarkably similar with the exception of [big six firm] who were the dearest by quite
a higher percentage… they certainly weren’t knocked out on a cost basis (case 2), 
the fees quoted were extraordinarily close… so it wasn’t decided on fees (case 3),
in fact we didn’t go for the cheapest quote (case 5).
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The bases on which the final choice was made were: chemistry “on the basis
that… the chemistry between their team and our team was the best chemistry”
(case 1); personality/communication “the decision… was done on personality
and communication” (case 3) and “at the end of the day it comes down to
personalities” (case 8); prior experiences of the firms’ performance “[big six firm
A] presented nothing in writing to the board other than the actual accounts…
[big six firm B] produced a thirty- or fifty-page statement of the major
judgmental issues, major internal control points… extremely good
communication” (case 3); presentation detail “[big six firm] were very focused…
tailoring [the presentation] specifically to our needs” (case 6); geographical
proximity “it was the location that was the ultimate” (case 8); fees “we’re
desperately trying to reduce our overhead base… we couldn’t ignore the
difference [in fees]” (case 7); learning curve “in the end it was down to who we
thought could get up speed quickest” (case 2); and personal contacts “we had
some contact with [big six firm] in the past… the audit partner seemed to take
an interest and wanted to get involved and at that time was not receiving any
fee at all” (case 2) and “really, because the chairman knew the [big six firm’s]
partner that was it” (case 3).
Given the frequent similarity in bid fees, it was rational for selectors to focus
on other factors in making the final choice. In the case where the final choice
was fee-based, it was considered fortuitous that the change also involved the
replacement of “straight-laced, maybe more formal, much more serious” people
with a more “affable bunch of people”: 
You know when the [big six firm’s] man walks into the room that you’re 90 per cent sure he’s
going to be a serious sort of individual who probably won’t crack a joke with you for instance.
Whereas you can be 90 per cent sure that the [another big six firm’s] man would be the other
way around, you know. He will be very affable, he’ll smile (case 7).
The general picture to emerge from the interviews was that audit fees were an
important influence on choice only where the quoted fee fell outside acceptable
tolerance limits for what was believed to be the market price for the job. For
example: 
as long as the fee is within what I feel to be the market rate for the job (case 8), and 
I felt it was necessary to test the market and find out what the price should be (case 4). 
The audit fee did, however, surface as a primary driver of change if companies
felt that fees broke acceptable tolerance limits (see later sub-section on after
effects of the change). Interestingly, companies were less aggressive negotiators
when purchasing NAS, which were more widely perceived as adding value to
the company. For example:
we will take a different view of the audit fee to that of professional advice (case 11), 
due diligence and corporate finance work on acquisitions… that’s where we get genuine value
(case 4), and 
negotiated less on special transactions – added value to company (case 6). 
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Thus, the choice of auditor in tender situations is not based solely on either fees
(as, it has been argued, would be expected, given the distribution of risk
associated with audit failure among the parties concerned), or the expected
quality of legal audit provided to the shareholders, but rather on factors such as
the range and quality of NAS (economic factors) and expectations regarding the
quality of future relationships (behavioral factors). An interesting finding was
that an error of judgment, a foolish remark, or a silly mistake at any time during
the tender process was likely to rule a firm out, with some firms showed a
remarkable ineptitude in this respect. This again demonstrates the importance
of behavioral, in addition to economic, factors. 
After effects of the change
Four companies expressed satisfaction with their change of auditor. The main
problem arising from changes was actual or expected fee disputes. For one
company, the decision to change auditors for a second time arose because the
audit firm admitted having underbid and was believed to be attempting to
recover its losses by overcharging on other services provided: 
there was always this big pick between us which was fees. They had, of their own saying, cut
their fee rate by 20 per cent to get the job and they were expecting to be able to cover that from
other types of fees throughout… if we had a requirement for an insurance certificate
signing… we would get the signature back with a bill for £500 (case 1).
In another case, fee problems were expected to arise at the end of the current
fixed-price contract term: 
fees… is frankly an embarrassment… we don’t want an increase, we want a reduction and
they want an increase… the fee went down about 30 per cent, they are looking to increase it
significantly – like 50 per cent. I think the relationship will change because of that. (case 3). 
This anticipated problem had led to a review of “the scope of the work that they
do, to see whether we can jointly eliminate some”. In a third case the auditor had
complained about agreed fee levels 
they’ve said that they’ve lost a lot of money on a fixed deal (case 2) 
(despite this a further fixed-price contract was successfully negotiated). A
further company thought that they would only change auditor again
if there was an unacceptable continual rise in fee structures which made us feel that we were
not getting an effective price competition (case 5). 
Our explanation of the fact that price is the issue most frequently referred to
following appointment is twofold. First, directors interpret the accepted bid as
representing the market price for the job, thus subsequent audit fee increases
following appointment often exceed acceptable tolerance limits. Second, fee
disputes impair the quality of the working relationship between the auditor and
the auditee. Thus price and non-price factors are not always independent. 
A concern arose in two companies about differences in audit approach from
the previous firm. In particular, the auditors were spending less time looking at
internal controls: 
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although [the subsidiary directors] moaned and complained about this management letter
they got each year, that said that certain expense vouchers had been found not to be signed,
they themselves had felt comfortable that they were having a full check on their work… the
comfort that is gained from an internal control audit is worthwhile (case 1), and 
it has worked extremely well with this proviso that it has become an examination of material
figures only and a disregarding of the detail – I’d say dereliction but that’s too critical (case 3). 
Case one also had concerns about the pro-active role that the new auditors were
taking on accounting policies: 
there were these people coming to us and saying, “well, you are too clean, you don’t necessarily
have to have this accounting policy”… they stopped doing that after the first year to eighteen
months because they realized it wasn’t in our nature and, of course, the recession was starting
to bite. 
There were also perceived benefits arising from the auditor changes: “I know
the shareholders were pleased that we cut our audit fee” (case 5), “[the audit
firm] tell us where their concerns are… at an early stage” (case 3) and improved
accounting records “because we demand a lot from [big six firm]… we can’t
give them a scrappy piece of paper with a few figures on… we’ve got to give
them proper schedules… and full backing documentation… and that’s bloomin’
good for us” (case 2). 
One company was reluctant to change again (unless forced to by fee rises)
because “it just raises doubts in people’s minds unless there is a very good
reason for it” (case 5), whereas another finance director felt that, having just
agreed to the incumbent’s proposal for a further three-year, fixed-price contract,
subsequent change thereafter was desirable “if you get too comfortable… you
don’t have those fresh views” (case 2). Interestingly, one finance director felt that
current proposals for partner rotation would be “detrimental… to an ongoing
relationship” and lead to “a lot more tenders” (case 4). 
In all cases where tenders were conducted the prices quoted were below the
last price paid, and, given the switching costs in the first year, all bids would
also meet DeAngelo’s strict definition of lowballing, assuming the incoming and
outgoing auditors face the same cost structures and offer the same audit quality.
We suggest that the market is experiencing a widespread lowering of price in
response to fierce competition and that all switching costs are now absorbed by
audit firms. In the absence of information about firms’ costing and pricing
strategies it is not possible, however, to assert categorically that audits are
being performed below cost beyond the first year. 
The cases provide some evidence of efficiency gains arising from the
increased competition within the audit market. Fee reductions have been
achieved, with audit firms claiming greater efficiency in their audit work
(Brindle, 25 May 1995), although this is accompanied by tighter specification of
contractual terms. In addition, companies are improving their own accounting
procedures and providing better information to their auditors. Fee pressure has,
however, also led to other changes which may not be beneficial. In only one case
was an appointment made solely on the grounds of price. A key finding is that
three examples of the “winner’s curse” were identified, where the successful
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firm had bid low (although not necessarily much lower than other tenderers). As
a result, there was blatant overcharging for other services in one of these cases,
(which led to the removal of the auditors after three years) and attempts to
renegotiate the fees in the other two. These consequences, although predictable
where low bids have been made, were clearly resented by directors. In all three
cases concerns were expressed by the interviewees that arguments over fees
had undermined (or would undermine) working relationships. The quality of
the working relationship appeared to be of particular importance to the
directors, possibly because this was a primary basis on which the audit firm
had been selected in the first instance. 
These findings suggest that there is a need for variation clauses or the
renegotiation of terms, such as occurs with standard commercial contracts, to
become acceptable in the audit context to cover unforeseen audit problems. If
not, then cross-subsidization by auditors from the client’s other fees is likely to
occur in their efforts to improve margins (a response not generally available to
contractors in standard commercial contracts). 
Another response by the audit firms to fee pressure was to change audit
methodology. The focus is now on high risk areas, analytical review and the
balance sheet, rather than on the time-consuming detailed examination of
systems transactions and low risk areas. Although this may be a more efficient
and cost effective way of reaching an opinion, reviews of internal controls have
been much reduced. Assurance on internal controls was perceived by several
interviewees as fundamental to the quality of the audit process, providing
benefits to both the company and to the directors (possibly an alternative to the
cost of internal audit) although not strictly necessary to the reaching of an audit
opinion. This may have interesting implications for the implementation of the
Cadbury proposals on internal control, since further fee disagreements can be
expected to result from additional costs arising from work which some
companies may believe is already being performed. 
The tendering process has contributed to the perception that the purchase of
an audit is no different from the purchase of any other service. The unique
features of the audit function have become submerged by competitive pressures
and companies’ need, in the present complex regulatory environment, for
advice on the preparation of the annual report and other matters. This advice
has varying degrees of separability from the audit function per se, as shown in
Figure 1. Directors clearly believed that the availability of NAS added value to
the audit process. 
It would appear that audit market competition has led to a dilemma over fees.
It is, of course, properly part of the directors’ fiduciary duty to obtain value for
money for the shareholders, who delegate the responsibility for agreeing audit
fees to the directors at the AGM. The audit fee is a single disclosed figure in the
published accounts, and as a result it receives excessive attention in relation to
its materiality, with a reduction being used by directors to signal good
stewardship to the shareholders. Now that the total fees payable to the
incumbent auditors are also disclosable there may be a case for segregating the
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recurring compliance costs or including them in the audit fee so that the value
of separable non-recurring services may be identified. Some of the outcomes of
low audit fees may not, however, be in the best interests of the shareholders,
with the directors themselves (although wanting fee reductions) expressing
discomfort with the predictable behavioural outcomes from low pricing. This
dilemma was expressed clearly by one interviewee: 
From a shareholder’s point of view (and that’s really what the audit is there for) it’s a question
of whether the shareholder gets value for money and the company paying for it… you know
the shareholder has to be protected against malpractice… but as a director and looking for
value for money in terms of added value to the running of the business, which is a different
question altogether… the least cost is the best cost (case 4).
One victim of the “winner’s curse” emphasized the weaknesses in the tender
process: 
What we have found is that value for money is so very difficult to judge on a tender process
and the old adage that the cheapest is not necessarily the best has come through loud and
clear… I am not sure the quality of audits can be judged by the name… the city were getting
a better audit of us by the local firm… because that firm was putting a lot of man hours into
checking us over (case 1). 
Summary and conclusions
This study focuses on the audit tender process. Tender theory grounded in the
economics literature is used to appraise the relatively recent developments in
the market for audit services, which are illustrated using case analysis of 12
auditor changes, including nine competitive tenders. Consistent with theory,
audit tendering as a mechanism for effecting trades appears to have arisen as a
rational behavioural response by companies to the recession and the effects of
competition. In symmetric environments, all common types of auction are
efficient and lead to the same expected revenues for the seller and expected
profit for the bidder. Where each bidder’s costs of contract completion is a
random variable to be estimated, however, the winner is “cursed” – a result
which may partially explain observed lowballing. In addition, winners may,
Figure 1.
The degree of
separability between
audit and other services
provided by the
accounting firms
Due diligence,
corporate finance,
and tax advice
Audit
Consultancy
Compliancea
Note: aIncluding tax compliance and Stock Exchange circulars.
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rather than make a cost estimation error, intentionally bid low. This may be the
rational competitive response by the incumbent to capture expected quasi-rents
on subsequent audits (DeAngelo, 1981b), or it may be a strategic response to
gain market share or establish a “presence” in a specific industry sector. 
Formal analytical tender models which predict the “winner”, revenues, and
profits are, however, of limited value in the audit context, which is characterized
by asymmetry among the bidders, uncertainty with respect to contract
duration, and quality (in addition to cost) as a key choice issue. The complexity
of the environment in which audit tenders are conducted can be expected to
affect bidding behaviour in subtle ways, making the development of a
satisfactory theory of audit tender very difficult.
Economic theory predicts that, in audit settings, the selection of a winner will
be price-based, since the choice of a reputable firm ensures that directors can
demonstrate that acceptable quality thresholds will be met. Since, in most cases,
bids were relatively close in terms of price, our empirical results do not provide
a powerful test of this price hypothesis. Subsequent attempts by the winning
firm to increase fees do indicate, however, that the winning bid was too low, a
finding which is consistent with economic theory. Many directors appear to
view the tender process as relating not exclusively to the attest function, but to
a larger set of “audit-related” services (and possibly also non-audit-related
services). Despite this, the tender quote relates exclusively to the attest function.
We argue that the attest function is no longer effectively separable from certain
other services related to the external financial reporting process. Directors
clearly believe that the availability of NAS adds value to the audit process. As a
consequence, directors’ choice of auditor is not generally based solely on price.
Directors choose an audit firm which they believe can best meet the company’s
specific needs with respect to both audit and NAS and with whom they feel they
can establish the most satisfactory working relationship. Thus both economic
and behavioural factors influence auditor choice. 
In common with comparable three-party contractual situations, there is
prima facie evidence of efficiency gains in the form of technical improvements,
the improvement of corporate accounting procedures, and (possibly) lower
audit fees. We have no clear evidence that the process of reaching the legal
opinion has been compromised by tendering and associated fee reductions,
nevertheless the added value of the audit process may have been diminished in
some companies where, for example, internal control reviews have ceased. We
do, however, believe that economic dependence may have increased because
competition has made the replacement of lost clients more difficult and
expensive. 
Concerns that the provision of NAS by audit firms may threaten
independence have led to calls that such provision be prohibited. We question,
however, the possibility (or indeed desirability) of separating audit from other
audit-related services, since this could threaten the quality of the financial
reporting function. If such a prohibition were to occur, the potential for cross-
subsidization from other fees paid by the client would be eliminated. A general
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policy of lowballing would become unfeasible unless cross-subsidization was
shifted onto fees paid by other clients and/or the additional costs associated
with unforseen audit problems were covered by variation clauses or led to the
renegotiation of terms, as occurs in standard commercial contracts. Certainly
tendering procedures, if not the contracts themselves, are becoming more
sophisticated, as evidenced by the procedures adopted in the one case where a
second tender had been conducted. 
Auditor choice is clearly a multidimensional decision, contingent upon each
company’s specific circumstances. Ideally, companies would want high quality
audit and non-audit services (including internal control evaluation), good
relationships, and value for money. Where no firm ranks top on all of these
dimensions, complex trade-off are made. Our findings reveal the influence of
price versus non-price competition within the external audit market. The three
principal dimensions of non-price competition appear to be: audit quality,
quality of NAS, and quality of working relationships. The relative importance
of each dimension, and each form of competition, is found to vary across
companies. High fees were a contributing reason for change in only two cases
and in only one case influenced the final choice of new audit firm. Given the
frequent similarity in bid fees, it is rational for choice to be based on non-price
factors. The main problem arising from changes was, however, actual or
expected fee disputes, since companies are generally anxious to be seen to
obtain value for money. Competition, through the tender process, has
apparently established a “market price” for each audit. Incumbents who move
outside fee level tolerance limits damage the auditor-client relationship and risk
replacement. 
Our findings support the concerns of Sir Ron Dearing in the UK, who
believes that the auditor’s position is weakened by existing appointment
procedures, whereby directors can appoint, remunerate and dismiss auditors
with little risk of challenge (FRC, 1991). The risk- free nature of the audit
appointment for directors, combined with competitive pressures, may have
shifted the balance of power in favour of directors. Our interview evidence
indicates clearly that directors view auditor appointment as being in their
hands and largely for their (not the shareholders) benefit. In the UK, the APB
(1994) has proposed that audit committees take specific responsibility for such
matters, whereas ICAS (1993) has proposed that an Audit Review Panel,
completely independent of the directors, take this responsibility, thus removing
the absolute control which directors have over the whole process. An interesting
alternative solution would be that adopted in Italy, where auditor changes by
listed companies (and the related fee) require approval by their regulatory body
(CONSOB). We believe that there may be a case for recognition of the de facto
position that auditors are appointed by directors and for their position to be
protected by fixed-term, say three or four year, appointments, although this
could bring the risk of more tenders on each re-appointment and increase fee
pressure. 
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In sum, the efficiency of current tendering arrangements as a mechanism for
effecting trades in the audit context is called into question, in particular because
of the power of the directors, the balance of risk borne by them, the inclusion of
other services (some of which are inseparable) in a bid where only audit is
priced, the uncertain duration of the contract, and the possibility of cross
subsidization if a loss making bid is won.
The findings of this study suggest that further research in this area is
warranted, particularly in-depth, case study analysis of audit tenders which
contextualize the evidence collected and compare and contrast the perspectives
of different parties. Additional areas of research would be a more systematic
study of the long term effects of auditor change (distinguishing changes via
tenders from other changes) on fees and a deeper exploration of the auditor-
director relationship. Of particular interest in the latter area is the directors’
apparent need for a continuing good relationship with their auditors and the
perceived threat that bargaining over fees presents to this. This relationship,
and the effects of competition on independence, quality, and pricing strategy,
should also be explored from the perspective of the audit firms:
The Comptroller and Auditor General shall hold office during good behaviour, subject,
however, to removal therefrom by her Majesty, on an address from the two Houses of
Parliament. (Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1866)
Notes
1. There exist three interrelated sources of demand for external audit: agency demand,
information demand and insurance demand (Wallace, 1980).
2. It is acknowledged that this model does not capture the full complexities of the choice
process (Francis and Wilson, 1988, p. 680). Noting that this economic theory of auditor
choice is a normative theory we argue that, to explain actual auditor choices, the model will
need to incorporate behavioural/social factors.
3. An auction is a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource
allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the marketing participants (McAfee and
McMillan, 1987, p. 701). There are two perspectives, depending on whether the auctioneer
(or bid taker) is the seller/buyer (and hence bidders are buyer/sellers). Most usually, the
auctioneer is the seller (or seller’s representative); however, in industrial procurement (as in
audit services) the auctioneer is the buyer. The term “tender” is reserved for this latter form
of auction.
4. Milgrom (1989, p. 9) illustrated this as follows: “suppose there are two bidders, one who is
known to have a personal reservation price, or valuation, of $101 and a second whose
valuation is either $50 with profitability 4/5 or $75 with probability of 1/5. The first bidder
is assumed not to know the valuation of the second, but he knows its distribution. If the
first bidder bids $51, he will win $50 (his valuation minus his bid) at least 4/5 of the time,
yielding an expected profit of at least $40. If he bids $62 or more, he can win no more than
$39 (= $101-$62), so he will never make that choice. Since the first bidder never bids as
much as $62, an optimising second bidder must win sometimes when his valuation is $75,
and the allocation then is inefficient”.
5. In certain specialized industries (e.g. banks) the firm’s technical expertise in the area also
acts as an initial filter in the selection of tenderers.
6. Estimates of the duration of alignments for UK listed companies range from 20 years
(Beattie and Fearnley, 1994) to 50 years (Pong and Whittington, 1994).
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7. Bid preparation costs can be considerable, with the costs of bidding for a UK local
government contract estimated by a big six partner to be up to £250,000 (Accountancy
Age, 28 April 1994).
8. To the extent that the provision of audit services and NAS are interdependent, the decision
may not be risk-free.
9. Second tier firms were selected despite pressure from non-executive directors to appoint
big six firms; pressure partly driven by personal contacts and partly (we suggest) driven
by a self-interested desire for the additional protection of the big six name. In one case, for
example, a second tier firm was described by a non-executive director as “second-rate”.
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